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Abstract
This paper investigates the e¤ects of a graduate tax when the return to
education is uncertain and wages are determined through equilibrium in a
labor market with signalling. The consequence of uncertainty is that both
ability and initial wealth matter for educational choice. Compared to a
constrained rst-best the market outcome with uncertainty and signalling
results in an ine¢ ciently high number of people entering higher education.
Due to the positive wealth e¤ect over-entry is proportionately greater for
high-wealth individuals. The graduate tax reduces entry into education
so enhances e¢ ciency. However, it has undesirable distributional conse-
quences: low-wealth individuals are deterred from entering education but
high-wealth are encouraged. In this respect, the graduate tax has clear
failings as a method of nancing higher education.
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1 Introduction
The idea of introducing a tax on graduates has often been proposed as an al-
ternative way of recovering the costs of education.1 The basic concept of a
graduate tax is that students would not have to pay the up-front cost of their
education. Instead, the costs would initially be borne by the government with
repayment by graduates through a tax premium during their working lives. If
the tax is progressive with the rate linked to income, under such a scheme suc-
cessful graduates will subsidize the less successful Proponents of the graduate
tax argue that it is a fairer method of nancing higher education since gradu-
ates obtain signicant private benet from education in terms of future higher
earnings. It is also regarded as a good method of widening access for those from
less privileged backgrounds since it avoids the need to pay up-front fees and
provides a degree of insurance against future income uncertainty.
If the returns to education were purely private and certain, and the capital
market were perfect, then each individual would assess whether the net ben-
et of education was positive and the perfect capital market would make the
timing of repayment of costs immaterial. In these circumstances there is no
need for a policy to assist the less privileged since initial wealth would not be a
determinant of educational choice. It is unlikely that the market for education
conforms to this description. In practice, the return to education is uncertain
since individuals cannot perfectly predict the outcome when making educational
choices and imperfect capital markets will impose borrowing restrictions. When
education involves the production of human capital a standard argument for the
graduate tax is that, due to the risk in the future return to education and im-
perfect capital markets, there will be under-investment in higher education and
too little human capital accumulation. The under-investment will be particu-
larly severe for individuals with less initial wealth who nd it harder to borrow.
Hence, without a corrective policy entry into higher education will not be at
the e¢ cient level. In these circumstances a graduate tax may result in a more
e¢ cient level of entry.
The accumulation of human capital is not the only explanation of a positive
return to investment in education. Weiss (1995) provides compelling evidence
that part of the return to education (perhaps, even the entire return) is de-
termined by the e¤ect of signalling rather than through the accumulation of
human capital. Both signalling and uncertainty in returns have implications for
the properties of a graduate tax. In particular, when they are present it is no
longer clear that private educational decisions will remain publicly rational even
though they are privately rational. In the absence of intervention signalling pro-
vides an incentive for too many people to choose to undertake higher education:
the average product is paid to each worker which, for those on the margin be-
1 It has also been the subject of much discussion in the UK. See, for example, the Financial
Times editorial on 9 August 2010. (Available at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e4bcba5a-a3e2-11df-
9e3a-00144feabdc0.html.) and the Browne Review of higher education funding in the UK
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/le/422565/bis-
10-1208-securing-sustainable-higher-education-browne-report.pdf).
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tween choosing higher education or not, is higher than the marginal product. In
these circumstances, the argument in favor of the graduate tax needs a careful
reassessment.
The present paper addresses how a graduate tax a¤ects participation in
higher education and, hence, the impact of the tax on e¢ ciency. The analy-
sis begins by exploring the implications for the demand for higher education
of uncertainty about future wages, and wages are determined through equilib-
rium in a labor market with signalling as in Spence (1973). We extend the
analysis of the graduate tax of García-Peñalosa and Walde (2000) by explicitly
modelling intertemporal utility maximization, as in Levhari and Weiss (1974)
and Kodde (1986). Our model allows for heterogeneity in ability and initial
wealth and, because of signalling (or screening) in the labor market, education
acts as a signal to potential employers or is used by potential employers to sort
workers according to their unobserved abilities.2 It is important to note that
in contrast to human capital theory, in the signalling model education does not
augment productive capacity. Instead, it is just a process to convey informa-
tion about the unobservable ability level that existed before any education took
place. Consequently, if ability were observable it would be e¢ cient to have no
education. When ability cannot be observed the e¢ cient education level trades
o¤ the benet of sorting individuals into occupations (placing the high ability
into the occupation which is most socially valuable) against the cost of educa-
tion. We consider the success of the graduate tax against this second measure
of e¢ ciency.
The introduction of the graduate tax is modelled through the government
subsidizing higher education costs and taxing successful graduates while main-
taining a balanced budget. The results show that uncertainty has important
implications for the desirability of a graduate tax. When the return to education
is uncertain an individuals initial wealth level has an impact upon educational
choice: a high-wealth individual will choose to undertake higher education in
circumstance in which a low-wealth individual with the same ability level will
not. This positive wealth e¤ect is consistent with the results of Levhari and
Weiss (1974) and Kodde (1986). We show that the graduate tax discourages
people from choosing higher education even though it provides a subsidy to
costs. Since there is over-education without the tax this is a benecial outcome.
However, the graduate tax proves more discouraging to low-wealth individuals
than to those with high-wealth, so exacerbates the positive wealth e¤ect. After
implementation of the graduate tax proportionately more high-wealth individ-
uals receive higher education. Hence, the graduate tax in conjunction with a
subsidy to costs is not a mechanism that provides encouragement for low-wealth
2Weiss (1995) distinguishes between the signalling model in which the informed (students)
move rst by choosing an education level and the screening models in which the uninformed
(rms) move rst by o¤ering contracts. In equilibrium the relationship between wages and
education could be the outcome of either students choosing an education programme to signal
their ability, or the education level being chosen in response to the relative wage o¤ers of rms,
in which case wages would serve to screen workers. Our model corresponds to the signalling
interpretation.
3
individuals to undertake higher education.
These results have important policy implications. If signalling does play a
signicant role in determining earnings, individuals have an incentive to signal
their innate ability and this may cause over-investment in education. The extra
supply of educated workers drives down the wage for those with higher educa-
tion. The uncertainty with regard to future income results in a positive wealth
e¤ect but the introduction of a graduate tax still fails to encourage people with
high ability but from low-wealth backgrounds to invest in education. Thus, even
if the capital market is perfect, when education acts as a signal the introduction
of a graduate tax will not be an e¢ cient solution since it will further intensify
the problem of over-investment among the wealthy with low ability.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our model of edu-
cational choice with signalling. Section 3 explores the division of the population
between educational choices and demonstrates the positive wealth e¤ect and
excess education result. Section 4 demonstrates the e¤ect of the graduate tax
on equilibrium and shows that its e¤ects depend upon wealth level. Section 5
discusses the outcome under alternative assumptions on information structure.
Conclusions are provided in Section 6. The proofs of the results are given in the
Appendix.
2 The Model
Following Levhari and Weiss (1974) and Eaton and Rosen (1980) we model
educational choice in a two-period setting. Let x1i and x
2
i ; i = e; n; denote
consumption in the rst- and second-period of life where the subscript e de-
notes that higher education has been chosen and n that it has not been chosen.
Preferences are represented by the time separable expected utility function
EU = U(x1i ) + E(U(~x
2
i )); (1)
where  measures the degree of time preference. The ~ indicates that second-
period consumption can be a random variable: rst-period consumption is al-
ways certain but second-period consumption will depend upon the realization of
the educational outcome. We assume that the utility function satises standard
concavity assumptions and that limxti!0 U
0(xti) =1:
The price of rst-period consumption and the price of second-period con-
sumption are both normalized to one. The individual maximizes utility subject
to a budget constraint that depends on whether investment in higher education
is undertaken or not. A perfect capital market is assumed so each individual
can borrow and lend at the same rate of interest, r.3 Individuals di¤er in terms
of their ability, a; and initial wealth, m. The level of initial wealth is intended
to capture the ease with which an individual can access resources to nance
higher education. In a practical interpretation it would be related to the wealth
level of the family and the willingness of the family to provide nancial support.
3The consequences of relaxing this assumption are discussed in Section 5.
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The distribution of ability and initial wealth in the population is described by
the density function f(a;m) with range [amin; amax]  [mmin;mmax] : Each in-
dividual is informed about their own ability before the decision on whether to
invest in higher education is made. The level of ability is also the (unobservable)
marginal product in employment if higher education is undertaken.
The educational choice of an individual involves either investing in higher
education or not investing. The choice that gives the highest level of utility is
chosen. An individual who chooses not to invest in higher education works in a
non-graduate job in both periods and earn wages w1n and w
2
n in periods 1 and
2 respectively with certainty. For simplicity, it is assumed that w1n = w
2
n = wn:
An individual who chooses higher education trains in period 1 and works
in period 2. An element of uncertainty is introduced by modelling the second
period wage, w2e ; as dependent on the outcome of education. We label the
outcome as pass, p; or fail, f .4 The probability of passing is given by the
monotonically increasing function of ability (a) and, hence, the probability of
failing by 1 (a). Education acts as a signal of ability. Employers can observe
the level of education and whether a pass or fail was obtained but not ability or
wealth. Therefore, employers pay their workforce according to their education
level based on the average product (ability) of the two types (pass and fail). A
worker who is a failwill receive wage w2f while a passwill receive wage w
2
p;
where w2p > w
2
f . The costs of education consist of a direct cost, c; as well as the
opportunity cost in terms of forgone earnings in the rst period.
Notice that in the signalling model the wage is not a function of individual
ability. Instead, it is the probability of passing or failing that depends on ability.
Any human capital accumulation associated with education is ignored, so that
undertaking education does not increase productivity but just provides a signal
of unobservable ability.
3 Equilibrium without Intervention
This section determines the educational choices that emerge when there is no
government intervention. We rst analyze the individual decision problem and
then characterize market equilibrium with educational signalling. The ine¢ -
ciency of the equilibrium is also explored.
From an individual perspective, whether higher education increases the wage
as a result of signalling or because of human capital accumulation makes no dif-
ference. In either case, an individual will choose to undertake higher education
if the expected private marginal benet exceeds the private marginal cost. If
the outcome of education is certain and capital markets are perfect the decision
reduces to a present value calculation of lifetime income under the two choices.
When individuals are risk averse the presence of uncertainty about the conse-
quences of education a¤ects the investment decision. In this case, initial wealth
4The labels could equally well refer to di¤erent levels of attainment, such as "distinction"
and "pass" or "rst" and "second". What is important is that the outcome is not known for
sure when the investment decision is made.
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matters.
Consider the consumption choice of an individual who chooses not to pursue
higher education. The intertemporal budget constraint for an individual with
initial wealth m is
x1n +
x2n
1 + r
= m+ wn +
wn
1 + r
: (2)
The optimal level of rst-period consumption then solves
max
fx1ng
Un = U
 
x1n

+ U
 
(1 + r)
 
m+ wn   x1n

+ wn

; (3)
which has the necessary condition
U 0
 
x1n
   (1 + r)U 0  x2n = 0: (4)
Denote the solution to (4) by x1n (m). The maximum value function for the
optimization can then be written
V n (m)  U  x1n(m)+ U  (1 + r)  m+ wn   x1n(m)+ wn : (5)
If an individual decides to invest in higher education the costs are known
with certainty. Hence, the rst-period budget constraint can be written as
x1e = m  c  s; (6)
where s is the level of saving. In the second period, the wage depends on the
realization of the educational outcome. If the individual achieves a pass, p, the
budget constraint is
x2p = w
2
p + (1 + r)(m  c  x1e), (7)
whereas if a fail, f , is obtained the second-period budget constraint is
x2f = w
2
f + (1 + r)(m  c  x1e): (8)
The assumptions on the utility function ensure that the individual will not
choose an intertemporal plan for which second-period consumption is negative
for either educational outcome. Using (7) and (8), the expected utility resulting
from choosing education is
EUe = U(x1e) + (a)U(w
2
p + (1 + r)(m  c  x1e))
+ (1  (a))U(w2f + (1 + r)(m  c  x1e)): (9)
The necessary condition for the intertemporal allocation of consumption is
U 0
 
x1e
   (a) (1 + r) U 0  x2p  (1   (a)) (1 + r) U 0  x2f = 0: (10)
Solving for x1e generates the consumption function
x1e = x
1
e(m; a): (11)
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The second-period consumption levels in the two states are obtained by substi-
tuting x1e into (7) and (8) to give
x2k = x
2
k(m; a) k = f; p: (12)
Substituting the consumption levels back into (9) gives
V e(m; a)  U  x1e(m; a)+  (a) U  x2p(m; a)+ (1   (a)) U  x2f (m; a) ;
(13)
where V e is the maximum value of expected indirect utility for an individual
with ability a and wealth m if education is chosen.
The educational choice of an individual is made by comparing utility with,
and without, education. If V e(m; a) > V n (m), then an individual with initial
wealth m and ability a will choose education. Education will not be chosen if
V e(m; a) < V n (m). For given m we call the value of a that implies V e(m; a) =
V n (m) the cut-o¤ level of a: Since the probability of passing or failing higher
education depends on ability, the level of ability matters in determining the
choice of higher education. Observe that
@V e(m; a)
@a
= 0 (a) U
 
x2p

+ (1  0 (a)) U  x2f > 0: (14)
so, for any given value of m, the population partitions with respect to a: those
with ability below the cut-o¤ level of a choose no education whereas those with
ability above the cut-o¤ choose education.
The e¤ect of the level of initial wealth, m; on the choice of education under
uncertainty is important from a policy perspective. Many policy interventions
have been driven by the belief that those with limited resources are deterred from
entering higher education. In the standard model of human capital investment
under certainty, for example Becker (1964) and Ben Porath (1967), initial wealth
has no e¤ect on educational choice. The separation theorem implies that the
consumer maximizes the present value of life-time income in the rst period
by choosing the level of education, and in the second period decides upon the
optimal allocation of wealth over consumption in the two periods. However, the
literature relating to the demand for education under uncertainty has noted the
presence of income e¤ects (Levhari and Weiss (1974), Kodde (1986), Snow and
Warren (1990)) so that initial wealth a¤ects educational choice. Kodde (1986)
demonstrates that decreasing absolute risk aversion implies a positive income
e¤ect under uncertainty.
We now show that a similar result holds in the signalling model where we
interpret a positive income e¤ect to mean that the cut-o¤ level of ability de-
creases as initial wealth increases. This is stated formally as lemma 1. To state
the lemma we write the condition for indi¤erence between education and no
education as
U
 
x1n(m)

+ U
 
(1 + r)
 
x2n(m)

+ wn
  U  x1e(m; a;w2f ; w2p)
  (a) U  x2p(m; a;w2f ; w2p)  (1   (a)) U  x2f (m; a;w2f ; w2p) = 0; (15)
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and denote the implied solution of (15) by
a = 
 
m;w2f ; w
2
p

: (16)
Proposition 1 With decreasing absolute risk aversion the function 

m;w2f ; w
2
p

is strictly monotonically decreasing in m: It is constant when absolute risk aver-
sion is constant, and strictly monotonically increasing in m with increasing
absolute risk aversion.
The intuition behind the lemma is that the variance of individual lifetime
wealth depends on initial wealth. If initial wealth is high, the additional earn-
ings that an individual receives from education constitute a small portion of
total wealth, which reduces the utility consequences of the uncertainty of ed-
ucational outcome. However, if initial wealth is low, the additional earnings
from education will be a larger proportion of the total wealth, thus the outcome
of educational uncertainty will have a signicant impact. Individuals with low
wealth are therefore deterred from choosing higher education by the riskiness of
the outcome if absolute risk aversion is higher at lower wealth levels.
We can now use the description of individual choice to characterize equilib-
rium. Since employers cannot observe the ability level of an individual, a wage
is paid based on the average product (ability) of each type (pass or fail). The
equilibrium wages for the two types ensure that the educational choices of the
population are consistent with those wages. To state the equilibrium conditions,
dene the function
A
 
m;w2f ; w
2
p

= max

amin;min


 
m;w2f ; w
2
p

; amax
		
: (17)
The ability level A

m;w2f ; w
2
p

is the cut-o¤ ability level at initial wealth m
taking into account the limits on ability. The denition of equilibrium then
follows:
Denition 2 An equilibrium for the economy is a pair
n
w2f ; w
2
p
o
that simulta-
neously satisfy:
w2p =
Rmmax
mmin
R amax
A(m;w2f ;w2p)
a(a)f(a;m)dadmRmmax
mmin
R amax
A(m;w2f ;w2p)
(a)f(a;m)dadm
; (18)
w2f =
Rmmax
mmin
R amax
A(m;w2f ;w2p)
a(1  (a))f(a;m)dadmRmmax
mmin
R amax
A(m;w2f ;w2p)
(1  (a))f(a;m)dadm : (19)
To provide a baseline from which to assess the e¤ects of the graduate tax
we now compare the market equilibrium with uncertainty and signalling to the
choice of a social planner. The rst step is to determine what information
structure allows a valid and useful comparison. This is a necessary step because
the signalling role of education signicantly impacts upon the nature of social
8
optimality. To justify this remark, consider being in the situation in which
the social planner is able to observe each individuals ability level and credibly
convey this information to rms. In this case social planner would be in a
position to implement a rst-best outcome that would not involve any education.
The social planner could directly tell each rm the ability of each worker so
education would be unnecessary as a signalling device. In this rst-best those
individuals with ability below wn would be allocated to the non-graduate job,
and those with ability above wn would be allocated to the graduate job with a
wage equal to their ability. This outcome would spare the economy the cost of
delivering education. As a consequence, any market equilibrium that involves
educational signalling will always be ine¢ cient relative to this full-information
rst-best.
To provide a more informative comparison between what the market achieves
and what the social planner can achieve it is necessary to consider the informa-
tion restrictions faced by the planner. Education has a signalling role because
rms are unable to directly observe ability so make use of educational attainment
as a substitute for observation. We therefore consider a constrained rst-best in
which rms hire on the basis of educational attainment but the social planner
selects which individuals can enter higher education. This describes a situation
in which the planner controls entry to education but cannot control hiring de-
cisions on the labor market. As a practical example of such a situation, until
very recent reforms the UK government determined the number of places each
university could o¤er on each course and controlled the educational testing that
determined entry to higher education. The justication for employers insisting
on using education as a signal is that they do not perceive the planners as-
sessments of individualsabilities to be credible so prefer to continue to judge
employees on the basis of educational achievement. In this constrained rst-
best it is still necessary to have the educational signal in order to direct some
individuals into graduate employment but the division of population between
educational choices need not match that for the market equilibrium.
The constrained rst-best is characterized by the cut-o¤ ability level, a;
which is the minimum ability for those who should enter higher education.
The value of a is chosen to maximize the total discounted value of income
in the economy net of the costs of higher education. In choosing the cut-o¤
the government takes into account the e¤ect of this choice upon the equilibrium
wage. We also assume that the government faces no constraint on redistributing
income; thus, we abstract from distributional issues. Due to the power of the
government to redistribute, initial wealth does not matter.
The constrained rst-best is dened by
a  argmax
(Z mmax
mmin
Z a
amin
wnfdadm  c
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
a
fdadm
+
1
1 + r
"Z mmax
mmin
Z a
amin
wnfdadm+
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
a
afdadm
#)
: (20)
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The necessary condition for choosing a is
wn +
wn
1 + r
=
a
1 + r
  c: (21)
Observe that (21) is precisely the condition that would arise in the economy
with no risk: it is simply the equality of the discounted value of income in the
two cases. This is not surprising, since there is no aggregate risk in the economy.
The condition di¤ers from that in (15) in two ways. First, in the market case the
marginal individual receives a wage equal to the average productivity. In (21) it
is marginal productivity that matters. Second, the market outcome also factors
in the risk involved in choosing education, which introduces the dependence of
choice on initial wealth.
From this point onward we assume that the preferences satisfy the property
of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Recall from lemma 1 that DARA
implies the cut-o¤ value of ability decreases with initial wealth in the market
equilibrium. It is therefore possible to determine the nature of the ine¢ ciency of
the market equilibrium by comparing the cut-o¤ level of ability for an individual
with the minimum level of initial wealth to the constrained rst-best cut-o¤. The
outcome of this comparison is described in proposition 3 which shows there will
be excessive entry into education as a consequence of educational signalling.
Observe, also, that the conclusion is not a¤ected by the probability of success
or failure.
Proposition 3 a > 

m;w2f ; w
2
p

for all m 2 [mmin;mmax] :
Combining propositions 1 and 3 permits the degree of over-education to be
related to initial wealth level. The cut-o¤ ability level falls with wealth and is
always below the constrained rst-best level. Hence, the following corollary.
Corollary 4 The excess entry into education is proportionately greater at high
initial wealth levels.
This characterization of the market equilibrium has conrmed the nature of
the ine¢ ciency. There is always excess entry into education, and this is worst at
high initial wealth levels. If a graduate tax is to improve upon this outcome the
graduate tax must reduce entry and, preferably, have a stronger e¤ect at high
wealth levels. Whether the graduate tax does this is investigated in Section 4.
Before proceeding, we demonstrate the results obtained so far using a numerical
example that is also used later to illustrate the e¤ects of the graduate tax.
The numerical analysis is based on a logarithmic utility function
U = log(x1) +  log(~x2); (22)
a uniform distribution for ability and initial wealth
f(a;m) =
1
amax   amin
1
mmax  mmin ; (23)
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and a probability of success in higher education that is quadratic
(a) = a2: (24)
These function forms are combined with the baseline parameter values amin =
mmin = 0, amax = mmax = 1; wn = 0:24; r = 0:05;  = 1;  = 0:5, and c = 0:2.
Using these values, and following (21), the value of the cut-o¤ ability, a; at
the constrained rst-best is
a = 0:24(2 + 0:05) + 0:2(1 + 0:05) = 0:692: (25)
The market equilibrium and the constrained rst-best are contrasted in Table
1. In this table pe denotes the proportion of the total population educated and
a0 = 

0; w2f ; w
2
p

. The fact that a0 < a conrms the excessive entry into
education because of the signalling e¤ect. The table also shows that excessive
education results in lower equilibrium wages for the two educated types.
Scenario w2f w
2
p pe a
0 a
Market equilibrium 0.693 0.788 0.562 0.465 -
Constrained rst-best 0.835 0.864 0.308 - 0.692
Table 1: Equilibrium Wage Rates
Using the equilibrium values of w2p and w
2
f , we can provide a graphical
representation of the division of the population into those who choose higher
education and those who do not. This is given in Figure 1 where the solid line is
the locus of cut-o¤ values and the dashed line is the constrained rst-best cut-
o¤. The gure shows how the cut-o¤ ability in the market equilibrium decreases
as wealth increases. As observed above, this is a consequence of the risk inherent
in choosing higher education. The gure also illustrates the substantial degree
of excess entry into education.
Table 2 provides an insight into the comparative statics of the equilibrium
by determining the e¤ect of an increase in the cost of education. Let pfb be
the proportion educated at the constrained rst-best and dene Io  pepfb : Io
is an index of over education. The results show that the equilibrium changes
in the expected way: the proportion entering education falls as the cost rises
and the wages for the educated rise since the mean ability of those educated
increases. The index of over-education falls as c increases, so higher cost reduces
the proportion choosing education at a faster rate than the constrained rst-best
proportion falls.
c w2f w
2
p pe
pe
pfb
0:2 0:693 0:788 0:562 1:825
0:21 0:704 0:793 0:542 1:819
0:22 0:714 0:797 0:524 1:758
Table 2: Education Cost and Wage Rates
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a
m
a0 a*
Figure 1: Excess entry into education
This section has considered the individual choice of educational level when
education is a signal and has demonstrated that there is a positive wealth ef-
fect. The market equilibrium and the constrained rst-best have been dened
and contrasted. The central result was the demonstration of excess entry into
education in the market equilibrium particularly among individuals with high
levels of initial wealth. We now investigate whether a graduate tax is a benecial
intervention.
4 Graduate Tax
The two key components of the typical graduate tax proposal are a subsidy
toward the cost of education nanced by a tax premium imposed on graduates.
This structure captures the features of the deferred fee system (such as HECs in
Australia) and the Graduate Contribution Scheme proposed for the UK where
repayment occurs through an additional tax premium when earnings exceed
a threshold level. We model a version of the graduate tax proposal in which
the tax premium can di¤er according to income level.5 This encompasses the
UK proposal as the special case in which the premium on the lowest earning
graduates is zero.
The question we address is whether the graduate tax a¤ects educational
participation in a benecial way when education acts as a signal of unobservable
ability. With signalling the private return to investment in higher education is
larger than the social return for the marginal student since they are rewarded
with a wage equal to the mean productivity of their type. We have shown
5Formally, it varies according to educational outcome. But outcome and income are directly
linked in the model.
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this results in a greater proportion of the population being educated than is
e¢ cient. Furthermore, under the assumption of DARA the over-participation is
proportionately greater at high wealth levels. The standard argument in favor
of the graduate tax that it encourages participation cannot be applied when
there is signalling. It is therefore important to examine what e¤ect the graduate
tax has with signalling, and whether this is benecial.
4.1 Equilibrium
We assume that the tax rate on the earnings of those who do not choose higher
education is zero, so any positive rate is a premium. The tax rate for graduates
who pass higher education is denoted tp > 0 and the rate for those who fail is
denoted tf  0. The UK proposal described above can be treated as the special
case of tf = 0 by assuming that the threshold for the premium is set above the
earnings level of the unsuccessful. All entrants into higher education receive a
grant, g; to o¤set educational cost in the rst-period of life.
With a graduate tax in operation the rst-period budget constraint when
education is chosen becomes
x1e = m  c  s+ g: (26)
The second-period budget constraint if a pass is obtained is
x2p = (1  tp)w2p + (1 + r)(m  c  x1e + g); (27)
and in the event of a fail
x2f = (1  tf )w2f + (1 + r)(m  c  x1e + g): (28)
Using the second-period budget constraints expected utility can be written as
EUe = U(x1e) +

(a)(U((1  tp)w2p + (1 + r)(m  c  x1e + g)
+(1  (a))(U((1  tf )w2f + (1 + r)(m  c  x1e + g))

: (29)
This implies a solution for x1e of the form
x1e = x
1
e(m; a;w
2
p; w
2
f ; g; tf ; tp): (30)
The condition for an individual to be indi¤erent between higher education and
no higher education becomes
U
 
x1e

+  (a) U
 
(1  tp)w2p + (1 + r)(m  c+ g   x1e)

+(1   (a)) U  (1  tf )w2f + (1 + r)(m  c+ g   x1e)
 U  x1n  U  wn + (1 + r)  wn   x1n = 0: (31)
This indi¤erence condition implies the function,^; that determines the cut-o¤
ability at each wealth level given the wages and the structure of the graduate
tax scheme
a = ^
 
m;w2f ; w
2
p; g; tf ; tp

: (32)
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The graduate tax scheme is assumed to operate with a balanced budget
so that the total expenditure on grants must equal the discounted value of tax
revenue from the second-period. To state the budget balance condition it is rst
necessary to account for the range of ability by dening the partition function
A^
 
m;w2f ; w
2
p; g; tf ; tp

= max

amin;min

^
 
m;w2f ; w
2
p; g; tf ; tp

; amax
		
:
(33)
The budget constraint for the programme is therefore
(1 + r) g
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
A^
f(a;m)dadm = tfw
2
f
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
A^
[1  (a)] f(a;m)dadm
+tpw
2
p
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
A^
(a)f(a;m)dadm:(34)
The budget constraint for the graduate tax system can be combined with the
process of wage determination to dene an equilibrium for the economy. It
should be noted that for some pairs of tax rates ftf ; tpg there need not be an
equilibrium satisfying this denition.
Denition 5 For given tax rates ftf ; tpg a balanced budget equilibrium for the
economy is a triple
n
w2f ; w
2
p; g
o
that satisfy:
w2f =
Rmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
a [1  (a)] f(a;m)dadmRmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
[1  (a)] f(a;m)dadm ; (35)
w2p =
Rmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
a(a)f(a;m)dadmRmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
(a)f(a;m)dadm
; (36)
(1 + r) g = tfw
2
f
Rmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
[1  (a)] f(a;m)dadmRmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
f(a;m)dadm
+tpw
2
p
Rmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
(a)f(a;m)dadmRmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
f(a;m)dadm
: (37)
4.2 Basic System
A very basic graduate tax system would impose a single rate of tax on all people
choosing to enter higher education and use the proceeds to nance a grant that
exactly matched the cost of education. This system would be described by the
conditions g = c and tf = tp = t:
The aggregate budget constraint of this graduate tax system is described by
(1 + r) g
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
A^
f(a;m)dadm = tw2f
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
A^
[1  (a)] f(a;m)dadm
+tw2p
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
A^
(a)f(a;m)dadm;(38)
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but since g = c
(1 + r)c
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
A^
f(a;m)dadm = t

w2f
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
A^
[1  (a)] f(a;m)dadm
+w2p
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
A^
(a)f(a;m)dadm

:;(39)
This can be solved to write
t =
(1 + r)c
Rmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
f(a;m)dadmRmmax
mmin
R amax
A^

w2f [1  (a)] + w2p(a)

f(a;m)dadm
: (40)
Using this result we have
tw2f =
(1 + r)cw2f
Rmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
f(a;m)dadmRmmax
mmin
R amax
A^

w2f [1  (a)] + w2p(a)

f(a;m)dadm
= (1+r)c
w2f
w
; (41)
and
tw2p =
(1 + r)cw2p
Rmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
f(a;m)dadmRmmax
mmin
R amax
A^

w2f [1  (a)] + w2p(a)

f(a;m)dadm
= (1+r)c
w2p
w
; (42)
with
w2f < w 
Rmmax
mmin
R amax
A^

w2f [1  (a)] + w2p(a)

f(a;m)dadmRmmax
mmin
R amax
A^
f(a;m)dadm
< w2p: (43)
The expected utility function when education is chosen is given by
EUe = U(x1e) + (a)U(w
2
p + (1 + r)(m  c
w2p
w
  x1e))
+ (1  (a))U(w2f + (1 + r)(m  c
w2f
w
  x1e)): (44)
Comparing expression (29) for the level of expected utility without the graduate
tax to (44) it can be seen that the e¤ect of this graduate tax system, for any given
value of x1e; is to increase consumption in the fail state and reduce consumption
in the pass state. If (a) = 0, this must lead to an increase in maximum utility
for any given value of m. By continuity, there will be a range of a for which
utility is increased. The same argument applies to initial wealth: the increase
in utility will be greatest at low levels of initial wealth.
These arguments can be summarized as a proposition.
Proposition 6 Imposing a uniform graduate tax and providing a grant to cover
education costs increases the participation of low-ability individuals and low-
wealth individuals in higher education.
This form of graduate tax assists the encouragement of low-wealth individu-
als into education but has the detrimental e¤ect of also encouraging low-ability
individuals who would otherwise choose not to enter higher education.
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4.3 Di¤erentiated Tax
We now undertake a numerical analysis of how the graduate tax a¤ects the
population choice for education and the equilibrium wage rates when the tax
rate can be di¤erentiated and the grant is not tied to the cost of education. In
order to assess the e¢ ciency of a graduate tax we compare the outcome under
the graduate tax scheme with the constrained rst-best outcome. The analysis
is undertaken using the same parameter values as in Section 3.
In Table 3 we report the equilibrium wage rates and the level of the grant.
The table also reports the index of over-education, Io  pepfb ; and an index of
income e¢ ciency Ie  YmYfb ; where Yfb is the present discounted value of income
at the constrained rst-best (see (20)) and is the present discount value of total
income net of education costs at the market equilibrium
Ym =
2 + r
1 + r
Z mmax
mmin
Z A^
amin
wnf(a;m)dadm
+
1
1 + r
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
A^

(a)w2p + [1  (a)]w2f   [1 + r] c

f(a;m)dadm
=
2 + r
1 + r
Z mmax
mmin
Z A^
amin
wnf(a;m)dadm
+
1
1 + r
Z mmax
mmin
Z amax
A^
[a  [1 + r] c] f(a;m)dadm: (45)
The second equality in (45) follows from the denition of equilibrium wage rates.
The results show that an increase in the tax rates raises the equilibrium
wages and the level of the grant. The wages rise because participation in ed-
ucation is reduced. This is reected in the index of over-education which falls
as the tax rates rise. Similarly, the index of income e¢ ciency rises with the tax
rates. Hence, the introduction of a graduate tax system can improve upon the
market outcome. An interesting feature of the table is that the grant, g, can
exceed the cost of education, c. This possibility is forced through the insistence
upon a balanced budget for the graduate tax scheme. At the higher rates of
tax the revenue collected exceeds the cost of education so provides a surplus
that is distributed to those undertaking education through the grant. There
is no reason why such a surplus could not be accrued following the practical
implementation of a graduate tax system. In welfare terms it may be preferable
for at least part of this surplus to be given to those who do not undertake ed-
ucation, but we remain within the tight description of the graduate tax and do
not pursue that possibility here.
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Scenario w2f w
2
p g Io Ie
tp = 0 0.69356 0.78890 0 1:82126 0.83492
tf = 0 tp = 0:10 0.69373 0.78889 0.021 1:82012 0.83505
tp = 0:15 0.69386 0.78904 0.03221 1.81925 0.83515
tp = 0:45 0.69456 0.78923 0.22300 1.81678 0.835412
tf = 0:25 tp = 0:50 0.69476 0.78947 0.23397 1.81325 0.835890
tp = 0:55 0.69496 0.78951 0.24478 1.81316 0.835933
Table 3: E¤ect of Graduate Tax
The next step is to determine the optimum graduate tax policy. We choose to
characterize the optimum policy as the pair ftf ; tpg that maximizes net national
income, Ym. The optimum policy, the resulting equilibrium wages, and the two
indices are given in Table 4. The optimum involves a tax premium for both types
(pass and fail) compared to those who choose no education. The grant paid to
those in education is in excess of the educational cost. The optimum policy
reduces the index of over-education and raises the index of income e¢ ciency
relative to the market equilibrium. Judged by these aggregate indicators the
graduate tax is a successful policy. However, it is important to stress that this
success is achieved because the graduate tax acts to reduce participation in
education. This is contrary to the claims made for the graduate tax that it
encourages participation.
Optimum
Tax Rates w2f w
2
p g Io Ie
tf = 0:24 tp = 0:53 0.69490 0.78951 0.23541 1.81274 0.835973
Table 4: Optimum Tax Structure
The numbers in Table 4 only tell a small part of the story. What is also of
interest is how the implementation of the optimum graduate tax system a¤ects
the participation in higher education relative to wealth and ability. The e¤ect
of the optimum tax structure compared to the market equilibrium is shown
in Figure 2. The solid line is the original partition of the population when
there is no graduate tax. The dashed line is the partition after the optimum
graduate tax system is implemented. The implications of the gure are sum-
marized in a proposition that shows how the optimum graduate tax reinforces
the over-education at high wealth levels observed in the market outcome. The
explanation for this nding is that the policy focuses on reducing total par-
ticipation in higher education and does not have the exibility to distinguish
between the low-wealth and the high-wealth. The low-wealth are more easily
discouraged from participation so the rather blunt policy of the graduate tax
mostly a¤ects their participation.
Proposition 7 The optimum di¤erentiated graduate tax reduces the number of
low wealth individuals entering education but increases the number of high-wealth
entrants. The positive wealth e¤ect implies that over-education is proportion-
ately worse at high wealth levels.
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Figure 2: Consequence for participation
The proponents of the graduate tax argue that it will encourage entry into
higher education particularly from less privileged groups. The analysis we have
conducted shows that, with education as a signal, the converse is true: a gradu-
ate tax system encourages participation by the more privileged but discourages
the less privileged. The graduate tax may be benecial when viewed from an
aggregate e¢ ciency perspective since it raises net income but this has to be
o¤set against its detrimental distributional consequences.
5 Alternative Structures
The analysis we have presented has made a number of signicant assumptions
concerning the information structure, the range of policy interventions, and the
nature of the capital market. We now discuss the consequences of modifying a
number of these assumptions.
Underlying our analysis has been the assumption that the capital market is
perfect. The e¤ect of this assumption is to limit the e¤ect of the graduate tax
since it is the most favorable environment for the private nancing of education.
If we had assumed an imperfect capital the over-education would not be as bad
so there would be less e¢ ciency gain from implementing the graduate tax. On
the other hand, with an imperfect capital market the distributional consequences
of the graduate tax could be even worse. Assume that low-wealth individuals
face a higher rate of interest for borrowing than those with high wealth, or
more generally that it just is harder for them to borrow to pay education costs.
Without a graduate tax the e¤ect of this is clear: it will enhance the positive
wealth e¤ect, so the cut-o¤ ability level will increase at low wealth. The imple-
mentation of the graduate tax has two o¤-setting e¤ects. The grant will help
ease some of the problems caused by the imperfect capital market which will
encourage entry into education by those with low wealth. Conversely, the taxes
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in the second-period will still cause the cut-o¤ line to pivot which will reduce
the entry of low-wealth individuals into education. If the latter e¤ect dominates
the graduate tax will still have negative distributional e¤ects on participation.
The graduate tax we have modelled is more general than many actual pro-
posals but remains restricted in its exibility. It is natural to consider what
would happens if a more general nonlinear structure of taxation were adopted.
In the present context this would not improve the functioning of the gradu-
ate tax. The reasoning behind this claim is that the ine¢ ciency is due to the
process of signalling and this would not be changed by a nonlinear tax. In
addition, the distributional issues arise due to the non-observability of initial
wealth, and a nonlinear income tax will have not aid in this respect. More-
over, within the context of the model there are only two income levels, so two
tax rates are su¢ ciently general when the range of incomes is so limited. An
alternative policy would be to use the graduate tax to provide a payment to
the non-educated. This will reduce the attractiveness of higher education and
reduce the excess entry. However, doing this would move beyond the proposed
self-nancing structure of the graduate tax.
We have adopted an information structure that permits neither the gov-
ernment nor the rms to observe ability or the initial level of wealth. We now
briey describe two alternative possibilities, each with implications for the grad-
uate tax. First, assume the government can observe ability but not wealth, the
rms can observe neither, and the government cannot credibly convey ability in-
formation to rms. In this case the government can implement the constrained
rst-best by using observed ability to ration access to education. This will work
because the market equilibrium has over-education for all wealth levels. Hence,
a graduate tax is not necessary in this scenario. Second, assume the government
can observe wealth but not ability. Then the solution is to remove the wealth
di¤erential by redistribution and use the graduate tax to push the cut-o¤ ability
level toward the constrained rst-best point. The degree of e¢ ciency that can
be attained is still constrained by the signalling e¤ect of education.
6 Conclusions
The graduate tax has been proposed as a method of funding higher education
that encourages participation, especially by the less privileged. This argument
may have some validity if the return to higher education arises from the accu-
mulation of human capital. On the other hand, if the return is due to signalling
then the argument is much less compelling.
We consider the graduate tax in the context of an educational choice model
with signalling and uncertainty. The uncertainty occurs because the outcome of
higher education is unknown at the point the entry decision is made. The return
to education is determined via signalling with education used by employers
to screen people according to their unobserved ability. Education does not
add to human capital and plays no role in enhancing productivity. Assuming
heterogeneity in terms of ability and initial wealth our results show that the
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uncertainty creates a positive wealth e¤ect so the cut-o¤ level of ability for
entry into higher education declines with wealth level. Furthermore, at the
market equilibrium there is excessive entry into higher education compared to
the constrained rst-best level. The introduction of a graduate tax reduces entry
into education which enhances e¢ ciency. However, the graduate tax has the
undesirable distributional consequence of deterring low-wealth individuals from
entering education but encouraging high-wealth individuals. In this respect, the
graduate tax clearly fails as a method of nancing higher education.
The graduate tax has been proposed as a way of overcoming the deterrent
e¤ect that imperfect capital markets and uncertainty have on entry into higher
education by the less privileged. This is achieved by providing partial insurance
against a poor educational outcome and by spreading the costs of education over
the working life so avoiding signicant up-front costs. These arguments seem
compelling but their validity requires careful examination. We have embedded
the graduate tax within a model of educational choice with signalling and found
that the claims made by its proponents are not met. The graduate tax increases
economic e¢ ciency by reducing excessive entry into higher education but does
this by discouraging the less privileged. In this situation the graduate tax is
not the solution to the limited participation of the less privileged in higher
education.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1.
The rst step is to determine the e¤ect of the introduction of risk upon rst
period consumption. Denote the choice of rst-period consumption arising from
(10) by x1e(m; a;w
2
f ; w
2
p): Changes in w
2
f and w
2
p that maintain constant utility
satisfy
U
 
x1e
 
m; a;w2f ; w
2
p

+  (a) U
 
[1 + r]

m  c  x1e
 
m; a;w2f ; w
2
p

+ w2p

+ [1   (a)] U  [1 + r] m  c  x1e  m; a;w2f ; w2p+ w2f = 0: (46)
Taking the total di¤erential of (46) and using the envelope condition
dw2f
dw2p
=    (a)U
0  x2p
[1   (a)]U 0

x2f
 : (47)
Totally di¤erentiating (10) and using the envelope condition again gives
dx1e
"
U 00
 
x1e

1 + r
+  (a)  (1 + r)U 00
 
x2p

+ [1   (a)]  (1 + r)U 00  x2f
#
 dw2p
"
 (a) U 00
 
x2p

+ [1   (a)] U 00  x2f @w2f@w2p
#
= 0:
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But using (47)
dx1e
dw2p
=
 (a) U 0
 
x2p
 U 00(x2p)
U 0(x2p)
  U
00(x2f)
U 0(x2f)

U 00(x1e)
1+r +  (a)  (1 + r)U
00  x2p+ [1   (a)] U 00 x2f : (48)
Since w2p > w
2
f it follows that x
2
p > x
2
f : Decreasing absolute risk aversion then
implies that
U 00
 
x2p

U 0
 
x2p
   U 00(x2f )
U 0(x2f )
> 0: (49)
Since the denominator of (48) is negative it follows (49) that dx
1
e
dw2p
< 0 which
shows that an increase in risk with constant expected utility reduces rst-period
consumption.
Applying the envelope theorem, the total derivative of the indi¤erence con-
dition (15) is
0 = dm

 [1 + r]

 (a)U 0
 
x2p

+ [1   (a)]U 0  x2f  U 0  x2n
+da

0

U
 
x2p
  U  x2f :
Given 0 > 0 and w2p > w
2
f it is clear that 
0
h
U
 
x2p
  U x2fi > 0. From
the rst-order conditions (4) and (10)
 [1 + r]

 (a)U 0
 
x2p

+ [1   (a)]U 0  x2f  U 0  x2n = U 0  x1e  U 0  x1n :
The rst part of the proof implies x1n > x
1
e, so U
0  x1n  U 0  x1e > 0: Combin-
ing these observation demonstrates that dmda < 0; so 

m;w2f ; w
2
p

is strictly
monotonically decreasing in m:
With constant absolute risk aversion
U 00(x2p)
U 0(x2p)
  U
00(x2f)
U 0(x2f)
= 0 and with increas-
ing absolute risk aversion
U 00(x2p)
U 0(x2p)
  U
00(x2f)
U 0(x2f)
< 0: The claims in the statement
then follow directly.
Proof of proposition 3.
Let ac be the cut-o¤ level of ability in the case of certainty ( (a) = 1, all
a) when each person is paid their private marginal product. Denote the wage
received by a person with cut-o¤ level of ability by w2c = a
c. Under these
conditions ac does not depend on m. So, from (21) it follows that ac = a.
Now retain certainty and introduce signalling. Assume the cut-o¤ remains
at ac. The wage received is the mean marginal product of the educated so
w2p > w
2
c . But a
c cannot then be the cut-o¤ since a person of that ability
will now strictly prefer to choose education. Hence, there is excess entry into
education and a0 > ac.
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Finally, introduce uncertainty. Begin with the cut-o¤ at ac. It is now the
case that for an individual with ability ac the payo¤ in both states of the world
is above their marginal product: w2p > w
2
c and w
2
f > w
2
c . Hence, they can-
not be indi¤erent between education and no education. This argument holds
irrespective of m.
References
1. Becker, G.S. (1964) Human Capital, New York: Columbia University
Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research.
2. Bell, E.B. (1984) Imperfect capital markets and investment in educa-
tion, Economics of Education Review, 3, 105 110.
3. Ben-Porath, Y. (1967) The production of human capital and the life
cycle of earnings, Journal of Political Economy, 75, 352 365.
4. Eaton, J. and Rosen, H. (1980) Taxation, human capital and uncer-
tainty, American Economic Review, 70, 705 715.
5. García-Peñalosa, C., and Walde, K. (2000) E¢ ciency and equity e¤ects
of subsidies to higher education, Oxford Economic Papers, 52, 702 722.
6. Glennerster, H. (2003) A graduate tax revisited, Higher Education
Review, 35, 25 26.
7. Glennerster, H., Merret, S. and Wilson, G. (2003) A graduate tax,
Higher Education Review, 35, 27 40.
8. Kodde, D.A. (1986).Uncertainty and the demand for education, Review
of Economics and Statistics, 68, 460 467
9. Levhari, D. and Weiss, Y. (1974) The e¤ect of risk on the investment in
human capital, American Economic Review, 64, 950 963.
10. Snow, A. and Warren, R. (1990) Human capital investment and labor
supply under uncertainty, International Economic Review, 31, 195 206.
11. Spence, M. (1973) Job market signaling, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 87, 355 374.
12. Weiss, A. (1995) Human capital vs. signalling explanations of wages,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 133 154.
22
